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OVERVIEW 
 
Background 
 
The 1999 Annual Meeting of the Universities Council 
on Water Resources, held at Kamuela, Hawaii, included 
a full day of papers and discussion on issues associated 
with privatizing urban water and wastewater utilities.1  
This is a topic of intense interest to many of those 
operating municipal utilities, and one that has stimulated 
heated debate in the public policy, resource 
management, and academic communities.  The issues 
are neither straightforward nor obvious.  Even the usual 
name for this phenomenon – “privatization” – is 
misleading.  In fact, the debate is concerned with a wide 
variety of strategies involving various combinations of 
public and private sector roles.  Early exchanges 
between proponents and opponents of increased private 
sector participation were often marked by mutual 
accusations of blind ideology and/or self interest.  
Predictably, little information was exchanged in such an 
intellectual climate. 
 
But the phenomenon under discussion is a real one of 
considerable current interest.  Investor-owned water and 
wastewater utilities have existed in the United States 
since the beginnings of the respective industries.  
Private sector participation in the form of contracted 
services also has a long history.  What is new is a 
greater awareness of the many possible flavors of 
“privatization” and an apparent willingness to look 
more closely at the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative approaches to providing water services. 
 
This relatively sudden flowering of interest follows 
decades of inattention.  Transfers between government 
and private sector ownership or operation were 
infrequent, attracting little attention beyond the affected 
communities.  For many years, the investor-owned 
segment of the water industry had been roughly constant 
at about 14 percent of population served.  The investor-
owned segment of the wastewater industry was 
generally considered to be negligible.  In fact, the 
private sector could be described as the “silent partner” 
                                                          
1 This session was made possible by the encouragement 
of Dr. L. Douglas James and the financial support of the 
National Science Foundation. 
in urban water services.  But the partner is silent no 
more.  At least not in Atlanta, Indianapolis, 
Chattanooga, Milwaukee, Oklahoma City, or in many 
other places.  Financial, regulatory, and citizen 
pressures are causing city after city to investigate and, in 
some cases, implement partnerships with private firms.  
Often, these arrangements are eagerly sought by 
political leaders as a quick solution to their problems. 
 
But this is uncharted territory for the great majority of 
water professionals and academics.  After spending 
whole careers in a relatively stable industry, where 
public-to-private ownership or operating transfers were 
rare and unremarkable, many find the evolving menu of 
options daunting, if not confusing.  It is difficult to 
know what the key issues are, much less how to analyze 
them.  The 1999 technical session at the Hawaii meeting 
was intended to begin a process of education for 
UCOWR members, one that has been well received so 
far.  This issue of Water Resources Update is intended 
to continue that education process. 
 
Summary 
 
The papers in this volume have been selected to provide 
a range of perspectives and emphases, and above all to 
be both provocative and useful.  But, taken as a whole, 
they are not comprehensive.  There are issues and points 
of view that are not represented here.  Still, the coverage 
is considerable. 
 
Paul Seidenstat has conducted extensive studies of the 
opportunities for privatizing traditional government 
services, including water and wastewater.  In this 
volume, he provides a balanced and careful presentation 
of the various forms of private sector participation in the 
water industry.  He also describes approaches that have 
been taken to inject competitive behavior into an 
industry that is fundamentally monopolistic. 
 
Seidenstat is followed by Janice Beecher, who is widely 
known for her close attention to the public regulation of 
investor owned utilities.  Here she approaches the 
privatization issue from the perspective of public policy, 
laying out the challenges presented by the contract 
operations and private ownership models of 
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privatization.  Various means of addressing those 
challenges are discussed, ranging from conventional 
economic regulation to structured competition. 
 
Adrian Moore argues effectively for long-term 
contractual relationships between public agencies and 
private sector operators, pointing out a number of 
advantages over short-term arrangements.  He believes 
that properly structured long-term contracts can lead to 
significant gains in the effectiveness and efficiency of 
utility operations.  However, he also mentions several 
concerns, as well as a number of research needs. 
 
Alan Manning and Dave Mason approach the subject 
from a completely different perspective.  They argue 
that the instances of superior performance by private 
sector organizations result from a fundamentally 
different mindset -- one that is business-driven and 
antithetical to the monopolistic thinking characteristic of 
government operations.  Manning and Mason argue that 
the performance of government organizations can be 
dramatically improved by interventions designed to 
change the culture and mindset -- to replace 
monopolistic thinking with business-driven “New 
Think” attitudes. 
 
On the other hand, Del Gardner reminds the reader of 
the inherent power of the private sector profit incentive 
to force efficient and socially desirable behavior.  Using 
data taken from four water systems in Utah, he points to 
evidence for greater efficiency in the private sector 
operations.  But, at the same time, he documents explicit 
discrimination in favor of public sector operations, in 
the form of tax relief and subsidized capital costs.  
Gardner concludes that taxes and subsidies should be 
uniformly applied to public and private water operators. 
 
At the time of the 1999 UCOWR meeting in Hawaii, 
Jim Roumasset served as Rapporteur for the 
privatization technical session.  He has kindly provided 
an edited version of his Rapporteur’s Report, which 
provides a cogent summary of the presentations at that 
session (some of which are not represented here), and 
Roumasset’s own observations. 
 
Two shorter, more personal comments are included in 
this volume.  Robert K. Davis draws on a lifetime of 
experience with water management -- serving at various 
times as a researcher, academic, advocate, and 
government official.  Citing a number of formative 
experiences from that career, he argues strenuously for 
the economic and practical common sense of private 
sector participation in the water and wastewater 
industries.  Charles Howe provides a valuable 
counterpoint by reflecting on the experience of Great 
Britain since the near-universal privatization of public 
utilities in the 1980s.  He notes rather different results in 
different industries, ranging from apparent success in 
gas, electricity, and telecom industries to chaos in the 
railroads.  In the water and wastewater industry, the 
picture is much cloudier, including public discontent 
with large tariff increases, little evidence of operational 
efficiencies, and general disappointment with the 
efficacy of regulation. 
 
Even this skeletal summary of these papers must 
suggest a topic with many layers, nuances, perspectives, 
and details.  After reading this volume, no one will 
believe that their education in these matters is complete.  
However, we do hope that what follows is a useful 
beginning. 
 
CONTEXT 
 
In considering any change in ownership or operating 
responsibility for water or wastewater service, it is 
necessary to consider expected changes in the user 
tariffs.  This is not the only decision criterion, of course, 
but it is one that often assumes great importance.  Most 
of the authors in this volume make reference to impacts 
on user charges.  But fees and charges paid by 
consumers do not arise directly from economic 
efficiency, or lack of it.  They do not depend directly on 
private sector/public sector choices, on management 
incentives, on accountability, or on many of the other 
improvements identified here as worthy of attention.  
User tariffs are designed to match revenues to revenue 
requirements, and as such are based on accounting data.  
Certainly, many aspects of ownership, management, and 
finance ultimately determine those accounting data, but 
the differences between government-owned and 
investor-owned ratemaking are more extensive.  Del 
Gardner raises this issue, using data from several Utah 
utilities.  But comparisons made in his and other papers 
suggest a need for a more detailed exposition. 
 
Accordingly, some illustrative accounting data are 
presented here.  Revenue and expense statements are 
summarized for two utilities identical in every way 
except for ownership and resulting regulatory treatment.  
For various reasons, it is convenient to approach this 
comparison by taking actual data from an investor-
owned utility, then modifying those data to simulate a 
hypothetical government-owned utility.  The original 
data, for a recent year, are generally based on actual 
results for a small water and wastewater utility serving a 
community of about 4,000 persons in a Middle Atlantic 
state.  The utility is and always has been investor-
owned.  It is subject to rate of return regulation by the 
relevant state commission.  In adjusting financial results 
to simulate a government-owned operation, a number of 
assumptions are required.  These are discussed below. 
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Operating Revenue 
 
The operating revenue for the investor-owned utility 
reflects a tariff adopted pursuant to a recent regulatory 
order.  The rates and charges have been set in 
accordance with the allowed rate of return on rate base.  
However, since the new tariff level is significantly 
different from the one in effect just before the change, 
water use has been adjusted slightly downward 
consistent with the expected price elasticity of demand.  
Rates, charges, number of connections, and adjusted 
water use then produce the operating revenue. 
 
In the case of the government-owned utility, operating 
and maintenance expenses and other costs are used to 
calculate the revenue requirement.  It is assumed that 
operating revenue will equal the revenue requirement.  
This implies the further assumption that the government 
utility has adjusted the tariff so as to compensate for any 
price elasticity effect.  This may result in higher water 
use than in the case of investor-owned operation, which 
would require upward adjustment to variable operating 
cost (and, possibly, to capital costs), but these second-
order adjustments have not been made here. 
 
Operating and Maintenance Expenses 
 
Much of the discussion in this volume addresses the 
efficiencies that a profit-oriented private sector operator 
may bring to water and wastewater service.  It is widely 
believed that privatization will result in lower operating 
costs and lower maintenance costs.  However, despite 
substantial anecdotal evidence, there is little in the way 
of careful analysis to provide quantitative support for 
this belief.  Accordingly, the government-owned utility 
in this example will be assumed to have the same 
operating and maintenance costs as the investor-owned 
system.  In this way, the reader can consider the overall 
impact of various levels of efficiency gain with the aid 
of simple mathematics. 
 
Taxes and Regulatory Expense 
 
It is assumed here that the government-owned utility is 
unregulated and that it pays no property, gross receipts, 
franchise, inventory, or income taxes.  Therefore, all 
items in this category are zero for the government 
utility.  Note  that  some government-owned utilities pay  
 
some taxes, or make payments in lieu of taxes.  But the 
assumption used here is consistent with the more 
general case of no tax payments. 
 
 
Cost of Capital 
 
Investor-owned water and wastewater utilities typically 
obtain capital from three sources: customer 
contributions (connection fees, retained earnings, etc.), 
debt (e.g., long-term mortgage bonds), and equity 
(funds contributed by shareholders).  The amounts of 
capital in use by the investor-owned utility are 
approximately $3.2 million in customer contributions, 
$1.2 million in debt, and $1.1 million in equity.  Total 
capital is, therefore, $5.5 million. 
 
The state regulatory commission does not permit the 
investor-owned utility to depreciate or earn a return on 
customer contributions.  Therefore, the cost of this form 
of capital is zero.  The cost of debt is the annual interest 
expense (10 percent).  Because of the workings of rate 
of return regulation, it can be assumed that the net cash 
flow actually returned to shareholders approximates the 
cost of equity (about 12.4 percent). 
 
The government-owned utility is assumed to have the 
same invested capital ($5.5 million), and the same 
customer contributions ($3.2 million).  The remaining 
$2.3 million is assumed to be financed by debt, in this 
case government revenue bonds, with an effective 
interest rate of 7 percent.  So the total cost of capital to 
the government utility is $161,000 per year. 
 
Comparison 
 
Table 1 shows the revenues and expenses for the two 
utilities being compared.  The first line contains the end 
result: the revenue requirement for the government-
owned utility ($757,500) is only 75 percent of the 
revenue collected by the investor-owned utility.  
Depending on how the tariff is designed, this could 
translate into water prices a full 25 percent below those 
charged by the private sector utility.  But in order to 
understand this result, it is necessary to look at the 
causes for such a large discrepancy, and to look at 
factors that may mitigate the difference.
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Table 1:  Revenue and Cost Comparisons for Alternative Ownerships 
 
 Actual Investor- Owned 
Utility 
Hypothetical 
Government-Owned 
Utility 
Operating Revenue (from user charges) 1,004,000 757,500 
Expenses   
        Variable operating expense 74,300 74,300 
        Fixed operating expense 288,900 288,900 
        Maintenance expense 144,700 144,700 
        Depreciation expense 88,600 88,600 
                Total expenses 596,500 596,500 
Other   
        Rate case expense (amortized) 7,700 0 
        Income taxes 89,100 0 
        Taxes other than income 59,400 0 
                Total other 156,200 0 
Utility Operating Income 
        (Revenue less Expenses less Other) 
 
251,300 
 
161,000 
Cost of Capital   
        Interest expense 115,200 161,000 
        Net cash flow to owner 136,100 0 
                Total Cost of Capital 251,300 161,000 
Balance 0 0 
 
 
The difference in calculated revenue requirements is 
$246,500.  The largest part of this is due to exemption 
from taxes.  Income and other taxes not paid by the 
government operator total $148,500.  This does not 
represent an efficiency gain for government ownership, 
it is simply a transfer not made.  In more pragmatic 
terms, if the local government were to acquire the 
privately owned utility described here, all levels of 
government would lose $148,500 in tax income.  This 
would be ultimately recovered by either increasing tax 
rates or other taxes, or reducing government services, or 
both.  On balance, the customers of this utility may be 
better off, but society as a whole is not. 
 
Regulatory expenses are also avoided by the 
government operator in this example.  If it can be 
assumed that the government sets tariffs and terms of 
service that are not markedly inferior to those that 
would be set by a regulatory commission, then this 
avoided expense represents an efficiency gain for public 
ownership.  It is, however, small ($7,700). 
 
The remaining item is the $90,300 reduction in the cost 
of capital.  There are a number of reasons for this 
difference: interest payments to holders of government 
bonds are partially or entirely exempt from income tax, 
so these bonds can be sold with significantly smaller 
yields; governments diversify risk much better than 
private sector corporations, so interest rates have low 
risk premiums; there are no equity holders in the 
government operation, so no part of the capital return 
will be subject to individual income tax or to investors’ 
risk premiums.   These effects describe a mixture of 
transfers (tax exemptions) and efficiency gains (risk 
diversification), with the transfers probably explaining 
the largest part of the apparent savings. 
 
Altogether, of the $246,500 difference in revenue 
requirements, some amount more than $200,000 can be 
explained by transfers required of the investor-owned 
utility but not required of the same utility when owned 
by government.  As noted by Del Gardner, this 
constitutes “explicit discrimination” in favor of 
government ownership.  The balance, probably at least 
$20,000, represents true efficiency gains attributable to 
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government operation (avoided regulatory expense and 
risk diversification). 
 
But most of the papers in this volume speak of 
efficiency gains attributable to private sector operation.  
To the extent that these efficiencies are present in the 
investor-owner utility described here, and are not 
reproducible by the alternative government operator, 
then operating and maintenance costs for government 
operation should be increased, along with the resulting 
revenue requirement. 
 
In this example, depreciation expense is not subject to 
reduction, and variable operating expense may be 
relatively independent of operator efficiency (it consists 
of electric power and chemical costs).  The remaining 
operating and maintenance costs total $433,600.  If the 
private sector operator is 5 percent more efficient in 
these areas, then the required increase in O&M costs for 
the government operator would roughly balance the 
efficiency gains attributed above to government 
operation.  In order to mitigate both the government 
efficiency gains and the effect of the transfers required 
of the private operator, the government O&M costs 
would have to be increased to $680,100, implying that 
the private operator has realized efficiency gains on the 
order of 36 percent. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This example is, of course, a single observation, not 
necessarily representative of the industry.  But the data 
are taken from an actual utility, and they are not 
considered atypical or particularly distorted by any 
other factor.  Several things can be concluded from this 
comparison: 
 
• There are possible efficiency gains that are unique to 
government operation (avoided regulatory expense 
and risk diversification).  But in this example, these 
gains are relatively small, well within the range of 
potential efficiency gains commonly attributed to 
private sector operation. 
 
• The taxes and other transfers required of investor-
owned utilities are relatively large and constitute 
economic discrimination in favor of government 
ownership.  In this example, the private operator 
must have realized efficiency gains on the order of 
36 percent to compensate for this discrimination. 
 
• In situations similar to the one described here, it 
appears very likely that a government operator can 
offer lower tariff levels than the investor-owned 
alternative, even in the presence of fairly substantial 
efficiency gains by the private operator. 
 
But, as noted above, tariff level is not the entire story, 
nor are the results just noted the end of any story.  This 
is simply offered as context for the much broader and 
better-elaborated papers to follow. 
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